

PARTY AND IDEOLOGICAL DETERMINATION AND POSITIONING OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

The article deals with the peculiarities of party and ideological determination and positioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies. It is stated that minority governments in this context considerably differ from majority governments, and therefore they are formed, functioning and responsible within the specific logics. The researcher found that party and ideological determinants and particularities of minority governments' positioning are peculiar "motivators" or "safeguards" of minority governments, since they define and identify different strategies for the formation or non-formation of minority governments, according to which minority governments operate. In this context, it was explained how minority governments are involved with the support of oppositional (non-governmental) parties, but instead guarantee them some political benefits, which makes it possible for minority governments to legislate.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, minority government, party, ideology, opposition, European parliamentary democracies.

PARTYNO-IDEOLOGICZNE CECHY ORAZ POZYCJA RZĄDÓW MNIEJSZOŚCI OWYCH W EUROPEJSKICH DEMOKRACJACH PARLAMENTARNYCH

W artykule omówiono cechy systemu partyjnego oraz ideologicznego określenia rządów mniejszościowych w europejskich demokracjach parlamentarnych. W tym kontekście okazało się, że rządy mniejszościowe znacznie różnią się od rządów większościowych, a to oznacza, że są powoływane, funkcjonują i są odpowiedzialne wg. konkretnej, właściwej tylko im logiki. Ustalono, że partyjno-ideologiczne uwarunkowania i funkcje pozycji rządów mniejszościowych są tzw. «motywatorami» lub «bezpiecznikami» rządów mniejszościowych, bo to one ustalają i potwierdzają właściwe strategie, zgodnie z którymi są powoływane lub nie rządy mniejszościowe, a także zgodnie z którym rządy mniejszościowe funkcjonują. Podsumowując, wyjaśnia to w jaki sposób rządy mniejszościowe są zaangażowane w poparcie partii opozycyjnych (pozarządowych), w zamian otrzymując niektóre korzyści polityczne, które umożliwiają proces przyjmowania aktów prawnych rządów mniejszościowych.

Słowa kluczowe: rząd, rząd mniejszościowy, partia, ideologia, opozycja, europejskie demokracje parlamentarne

Contemporary party theory has traditionally stipulated that governmental party ideologies play an essential role in conditioning political outcomes. Basically, leftist governments (government cabinets) are pursuing leftist policies and leftist political decisions, with respectively rightist governments pursuing rightist policies and rightist political decisions. However, this conclusion can be reached only with regard to competition within two-party systems, where one party tends to gravitate to the left spectrum, while the other party belongs to the right spectrum, as a rule. Accordingly, the formation of one-party majority or minority governments is inherent in such systems, so they do not delineate ideological specifics of the majority and minority coalition governments, peculiar for nearly all European parliamentary democracies. The latter depend on the criteria of the multiparty systems partisan and ideological nature, where, in parliamentary democracies, no party consistently (except for some cases, e.g. the United Kingdom, Spain and Malta) exercises control over the proportion of parliamentary mandates, sufficient to form a single-party government. This is the reason why the lack of parliamentary mandates to form one-party majority governments in multi-party systems leads to the alignment of formalized or non-formalized parliamentary / legislative coalitions that can be incorporated in majority coalitions or single-party coalitions.

In the light of ideology, such governments are peculiar, because any alternatives of legislative coalitions, incorporated by various government types, combine political parties that depend on an outside party parliamentary support to promote their own policies and political decisions. In this regard, they should ideologically focus not only on their own programmatic and political goals, but also on the programmatic and political goals of other parliamentary parties, and vice versa. Therefore, the ideologies of such parties and the governments they form are much more dependent than the ideologies of parties, endowed with a majority of parliamentary seats¹. Primarily, it has a profound effect on the party theory, as the ideologies of governments, formed around parliamentary / legislative coalitions in European multi-party parliamentary democracies cannot be homogeneously identified as leftist (leftish) or rightist (rightish), especially at the background of single-party governments in bipartisan systems. The point is that in bipartisan systems, the ideology of the government coincides with the party ideology, whereas multi-party systems are characterised by much more complex relationships, arising and evolving between the parties involved: between governmental (in case of majority coalition governments), or governmental and non-governmental (in single-party and minority coalition) parties. For instance, in multi-party parliamentary democracies, governments can be formed by both left-wing and right-wing parties simultaneously. It may

¹ Hartmann S., *Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe: How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies*, Wyd. Springer 2015, s. 89.

occur that government parties are ideologically commensurate, as they tend to gravitate either to the left or the right ideological spectrum more than other parties do. However, essentially, it is more complicated to assess the level of governmental gravitation towards the left, right or middle spectrum than in bipartisan systems. Moreover, it is utterly complex to predict policies, political preferences and political decisions that may result from the association of polar parties in minority governments. However, addressing this perplexing problem in respect of minority governments is extremely important, since designating their ideological focus and positioning of governments in parliamentary democracies helps to determine functional characteristics of minority governments, as well as parameters of their policies implemented and decisions taken.

In this light, crucial is the intention of parties either to form or not to form single-party or coalitional minority governments, as well as the parties' expectations of participating/not participating in establishment and functioning of such governments. It is occasionally more advantageous for a parliamentary party to be in opposition, in situ supporting minority governments, rather than form governments and directly implement their political agenda². On the contrary, the choice of the party largely corresponds to a particular type of party system, in particular to ideological positions of the parties in the system. Such party and ideological preconditions, determination and peculiarities of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies occur due to their construction on the basis of party-political representation. The fact is that the voters' power is delegated to the representatives of parties in parliaments and governments, thereby the parties determine the state policy in the process of exercising the executive power, and the executive power is responsible to voters through the parties³. In this respect, the political and ideological position of the minority government always results from inter-party compromise, making it more complicated for a party to implement its own program. For this reason the left-right ideological positioning of each minority government (being a form of coalition by nature) is hypothetically placed between individual parameters of the ideological positioning of the parties that are members of the minority government, facilitating its formation, support and functioning⁴. This affects the entire political and administrative process carried out by the minority government⁵. It is of utmost importance that peculiarities of party-ideological determination and positioning of minority governments presuppose that the likelihood of their formation is positively higher when the benefits of receiving ministerial portfolios are fewer than advantages of the parties' implementing their political programmes and ideological principles⁶. Consequently, minority

² Artés J., Bustos A., Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study, *European Journal of Political Research* 2008, vol 47, nr. 3, s. 307-333.

³ Mair P., The Challenge to Party Government, *West European Politics* 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 225.

⁴ Hartmann S., *Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe: How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies*, Wyd. Springer 2015, s. 91.

⁵ Keman H., *Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies*, [w:] Katz R., Crotty W. (eds.), *Handbook on Political Parties*, Wyd. Sage 2006, s. 160-174.

⁶ Kalandrakis T., *Minority Governments: Ideology and Office*, APSA conference, Boston 2002, s. 2.

governments in Western Europe are more frequently formed within a strategy to achieve political and ideological goals, regardless of the cabinet membership, whereas Central and Eastern Europe are more likely to adhere to the strategy of achieving political and ideological goals solely as a result of membership in the cabinet.

Therefore, some minority governments are more likely to occur when the largest parliamentary party is growing in size, thus becoming more centrist ideologically. In contrast, other minority governments are predominantly dependent on the anticipated utilitarian benefit / benefit for the party participation in governmental cabinets⁷. This is in behalf of the fact that parties that are not hypothetically governmental (or do not form the so-called proto-coalitions) may receive positive benefits in the form of non-political ones (not ideological), but other benefits in the form of cabinet offices that are decisive in the context of the formation and further functioning of minority governments⁸, reflecting a scientific viewpoint, asserting that parties as representatives of voters' interests care primarily about their political-ideological and power and authority goals⁹. Correspondingly, parties almost always encounter government-forming contradictions, resolving them on the basis of a consensus of political advantages, ideology and powers. Herein, the ideological dimension of the formation and functioning of minority governments by one party is of more significance when other parties, refusing to participate in governmental cabinets (office-based goals), show patience and ability to influence the politics of the parliament and also count on competitive elections. As a consequence, minority governments in terms of party ideology are predominantly defined within the framework of inter-party competition, or sometimes additionally defined by the institutional criteria of political systems.

On the whole, it is evident that through the prism of ideology minority governments are formed and functioning because the parties, involved in negotiating the government-forming process are radically different in their political views and, therefore, do not contribute to the emergence of majority governments. Undoubtedly, minority governments should not be expected to be formed under the circumstances when politicians and parties seek to achieve not political and ideological goals, but purely office-related goals and powers¹⁰. In other words, minority governments are traditionally formed when parties seek to fulfil merely their own political (political-ideological) goals, or concurrently both political and power (government) ones, however, they are not, as a rule, formed when parties seek offices and authority. Traditionally, with such a remark European parliamentary democracies positively bring into correlation the following conclusions and assumptions. Firstly, political and ideological polarization of

⁷ Crombez C., *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 27.

⁸ Kalandrakis T., *Minority Governments: Ideology and Office*, APSA conference, Boston 2002, s. 5.

⁹ Ström K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583-605.; Ström K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199-226.

¹⁰ Indridason I., *Coalition Formation and Polarization*, Wyd. University of California 2010, s. 4.

parliaments contributes to the increase in the minority governments occurrence, since in such a case opposition parties have no alternative but to support minority governments, if demanded to act so by minority party governments¹¹. Secondly, minority governments are more likely to be formed in the environment of ideologically divided and polarized opposition. As a matter of fact, the stances of party/ies, forming minority governments are more centrist and stable. Moreover, ideological composition of parliamentary opposition increases the polarization of parliaments, yet the presence of a central or centrist party facilitates the formation of not only minority governments but coalitional majority governments, as well¹². Thirdly, regardless of the minority governments' ideological composition along with their ideological environment (ideological stance of the opposition), minority governments are accustomed to relying on and counting on non-governmental parliamentary parties. This is indispensable in view of the adoption of both the laws of government initiatives and as stipulated by ensuring the survival of incumbent governments in the event of parliamentary procedures of confidence and no-confidence votes. It is easier to act in this manner in conditions of highly polarized parliaments. Fourthly, ideological determination of minority governments does not always unambiguously attest to the benefits of their formation, since even in projected cases coalition majority governments can be formed instead of minority governments¹³.

Therefore, we argue that minority governments in the midst of strong ideological opposition within parliaments, may face severe criticism for their activities. However, ideological confrontation of oppositional/ non-governmental parliamentary parties in such a case would hinder the early termination of minority governments. Instead, the blockade of a non-governmental party together with a minority government cabinet to counteract its ideological opponent is more frequent. However, another interesting point is that minority governments in European parliamentary democracies (particularly in systems of positive and negative parliamentarism) ideologically replicate majority governments (at least in those countries where majority governments are prevalent or frequently occurring). Accordingly, when contemplating the ideological stance of minority governments in the regional context, and in the realm of parliamentary democracy types (systems of positive and negative parliamentarism), the conclusions are not always unambiguous, especially in case of single-party and coalition minority governments.

For instance, in Western European systems of positive parliamentarism in regard of parties' ideology, one-party minority governments prevail over Christian-democratic ones, and among coalition minority governments, those that ideologically synthesize the principles of Christian democracy, liberal conservatism or liberalism, and social democracies. However, this situation is far from identical in all Western European systems of positive parliamentarism (see Table 1).

¹¹ Indridason I., *Coalition Formation and Polarization*, Wyd. University of California 2010, s. 10.

¹² Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

¹³ Indridason I., *Coalition Formation and Polarization*, Wyd. University of California 2010, s. 25-26.

Table 1. Ideological Positioning of Minority Governments in European Parliamentary Democracies (snapshot based on regions and types of parliamentary democracies) (as of December 2016)

Country	Ideological positioning of single-party minority governments (the number of governments)	Ideological positioning of coalitional minority governments (the number of governments)
<i>POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>		
Belgium (since 1946)	Social democracy (1) / Christian democracy (1)	Social democracy + liberalism (3) / Christian democracy + liberalism (2)
Greece (since 1974)	Christian democracy (+ liberal conservatism) (2)	–
Ireland (since 1944)	Conservatism (6)	Christian democracy + liberal conservatism + social democracy (3) / conservatism + liberalism (3)
Spain (since 1977)	Social Democracy (4) / Christian Democracy (+ Liberal Conservatism) (5)	–
Italy (since 1945)	Christian Democracy (15)	Christian democracy + liberalism + social democracy (11)
Malta (since 1962)	Christian democracy (+ liberal conservatism) (1)	–
Germany (since 1949)	–	–
Finland (since 2000)	–	–
France (1945–1958)	Social democracy (1)	Social democracy + liberalism + conservatism (2)
<i>POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE</i>		
Bulgaria (since 1990)	Conservatism (+ Christian democracy) (3)	Social Democracy + Liberalism (1) / Social Democracy + Conservatism (1)
Estonia (1992)	Liberalism (2)	Social democracy + conservative liberalism (1) / conservatism + liberalism (1)
Latvia (1990)	–	Liberalism + Conservatism (4) / Nationalism + Liberalism + Christian Democracy (5)
Lithuania (1990)	–	Conservatism + Christian Democracy (2) / Liberalism + Social Democracy (+ Social Liberalism) (4)
Poland (since 1989)	Conservatism (+ Christian democracy) (3)	Social Democracy (1) / Christian Democracy + Conservatism (2)
Romania (since 1990)	Social Democracy (4)	Social Democracy + Liberalism + Conservatism + Christian Democracy (10)

Slovakia (since 1990)	Conservatism (1)	Social Democracy + National Conservatism (2) / Christian Democracy + Liberal Conservatism (2)
Slovenia (since 1990)	–	Social Democracy + Social Liberalism + Liberalism (4)
Hungary (since 1990)	Social Democracy (2)	–
Croatia (since 2000)	Christian democracy (+ national conservatism) (2)	Social Democracy + Liberalism + Christian Democracy + National Conservatism (2)
The Czech Republic (since 1992)	Social Democracy (1) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Liberal Conservatism + Christian Democracy + Social Democracy (3)
<i>NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>		
Austria (since 1945)	Social Democracy (1)	Christian Democracy + Social Conservatism (1)
Denmark (since 1945)	Social Democracy (12) / Liberal Conservatism (3)	Conservatism + Liberalism (11) / Social Democracy + Liberalism (9)
Iceland (since 1946)	Social Democracy (3) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Social democracy + agrarianism + environmentalism (2)
Luxembourg (since 1945)	–	–
Netherlands (since 1946)	–	Christian democracy + liberal conservatism (7) / social democracy + liberalism (1)
Norway (since 1945)	Social Democracy (12) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Liberal conservatism (+ Christian democracy + agrarianism) (7)
Portugal (since 1975)	Social Democracy (7) / Liberal Conservatism (2)	Liberalism + Liberal Conservatism (+ Christian Democracy) (2)
United Kingdom (since 1945)	Conservatism (2) / Social Democracy (1)	–
Finland (1945–2000)	Social Democracy (2) / Social Liberalism (1)	Agrarianism + Social Liberalism (6)
France (since 1958)	Social Democracy (6)	Liberal Conservatism (+ Christian Democracy) (2)
Sweden (since 1944)	Social Democracy (18) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Social Liberalism + Conservatism (+ Christian Democracy) (4)

Źródło: Panchak-Bialoblińska N., *Uрядy menshosci v yevropejskych parlamentskych demokraciakh*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2017.; Ierac G., Poropat F., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUI Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, Źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/NP-DISES-4-2013_full-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.05.2019].; Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments databases: Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, ParlGov, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org> [odczyt: 01.05.2019].; Armington K., Weissstanner D., Knöfel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Wyd. Universität Bern 2014, Źródło: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armington/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.05.2019].

For instance, Belgian single-party minority governments tend to be left-wing Social Democrats or right-centrist Christian Democrats, while coalition minority governments combine ideological principles of Social Democracy and Liberalism, or Christian Democracy and Liberalism (occasionally Christian Democracy, social democracy, and liberalism). In Greece, however, minority governments are predominantly right-centrist Christian-Democratic and liberal-conservative. Irish single-party minority governments are typically conservative-populist right-centrist governments, whereas coalition minority governments combine the ideologies of Christian democracy, liberal conservatism, and social democracy, or conservatism and liberalism. Instead, in Spain, where single-party minority governments prevail, the latter are usually social-democratic or liberal-conservative (or Christian-democratic). Italy's single-party minority governments gravitate to Christian democracy, while coalition minority governments gravitate to Christian democracy, liberalism, and social democracy. The French single-party minority governments used to be social-democratic (until 1958), yet coalition minority governments predominantly adhere to principles of social-democracy, liberalism and conservatism (see Table 1 for details).

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe in the realm of positive parliamentarism proves to be miscellaneous, as well. In this region, on the average and in total single-party minority governments are predominantly conservative (with elements of liberal conservatism and Christian democracy), and social democratic, whereas coalition minority governments tend to combine ideological principles of social democracy and liberalism (particularly of social liberalism). Nevertheless, other ideological constructions of minority coalition governments are also widespread. However, in this region the overall situation also tends to be ambiguous. For instance, in Bulgaria, one-party minority governments are, as a rule, conservative (with elements of Christian democracy), and coalition minority government cabinets are prevalently social-democratic and liberal, or social-democratic and conservative. In Estonia, for example, single-party minority governments are mainly liberal, while coalition minority governments combine the principles of social democracy and conservative liberalism, or liberalism and conservatism. The minority governments in Latvia combine ideological principles of liberalism and conservatism, or nationalism, liberalism and Christian democracy, consequently being right-centrist or right-wing. Lithuanian minority governments synthesize conservatism and Christian democracy, or liberalism and social democracy, thus appearing primarily right-centrist or left-centrist. Polish single-party minority governments gravitate to conservatism, with coalition minority governments leaning to social democracy or Christian democracy, and social conservatism. In Romania, single-party minority governments are most frequently social democratic, while coalition minority governments combine ideologies of social democracy, conservatism, liberalism, and Christian democracy. Slovak minority governments are ideologically social-democratic and national-conservative, or Christian-democratic and liberal-conservative. Contrary to that, Slovenian minority governments synthesize social

liberalism and liberalism, while in Hungary minority governments have been mainly left-wing social-democratic. In Croatia, single-party minority governments appear Christian-Democratic and national-conservative, while coalition minority governments are Social-Democratic, Christian-Democratic, and Liberal and National-Conservative. Finally, the Czech single-party minority governments pose themselves as social-democratic or liberal-conservative, while the coalition minority governments tend to be liberal-conservative, Christian-democratic and social-democratic (see Table 1 for details).

It is only in the systems of negative parliamentarism in Western Europe that the situation looks more homogenous, since in this region nearly everywhere social-democratic minority governments prevail among single-party minority governments, and among coalition minority governments prevailing are those combining ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. Among countries with single-party minority governments, the only exception proves the United Kingdom, where conservative single-party minority governments prevail. As far as coalition-type minority governments are concerned, the situation is somewhat diversified. In Austria, these being Christian-Democratic and Social-conservative right-centrist cabinets, in Denmark - conservative and liberal, or Social-Democratic and liberal, in Iceland - Social-Democratic, agrarian and environmental, in the Netherlands - almost always Christian-conservative, and only occasionally - social democratic and liberal, in Norway - liberal-conservative, in Portugal - liberal or liberal-conservative (with elements of Christian democracy), in Finland - agrarian and social liberal, in Sweden - social-liberal and conservative (see. Table. 1 for details).

Such an ambiguous situation is complemented by the ideological positioning of the largest minority and second largest parties of both single-party and coalition minority governments. As illustrated by the European experience, the ideologies of the largest governmental parties that form minority governments are most often Social Democracy, and much less (but almost identically) Liberalism, Christian Democracy and Conservatism. Nationalist parties do not as a rule form minority governmental cabinets. Simultaneously, the ideologies of the second-largest government parties, forming minority governments, are most often liberalism, much less so conservatism, Christian democracy, and social democracy. In total, among the largest governmental parties of minority governments in European democracies are those whose ideologies are Social Democracy and Liberalism, and twice as less often Conservatism and Christian Democracy. However, this seemingly average logic works merely within Western European systems of negative parliamentarism, where the largest governmental parties of minority governments are traditionally social democratic. This applies, in particular, to Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, France and Sweden, and does not apply to the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Finland (see Table 2).

Table 2. Minority Governments Statistics by Ideological Positioning of the Largest Government Parties in European Parliamentary Democracies¹⁴

Country	Governmental party	Social-democratic	Liberal	Christian-democratic	Conservative	Nationalist	POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE
Belgium (since 1946)	First	3	1	3	-	-	
	Second	1	2	2	-	-	
Greece (since 1974)	First	-	-	2	-	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Ireland (since 1944)	First	-	-	3	9	-	
	Second	3	3	-	-	-	
Spain (since 1977)	First	4	3	-	2	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Italy (since 1945)	First	3	-	23	-	-	
	Second	6	2	3	-	-	
Malta (since 1962)	First	-	-	-	1	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Germany (since 1949)	First	-	-	-	-	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Finland (since 2000)	First	-	-	-	-	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
France (1945–1958)	First	3	-	-	-	-	
	Second	-	2	-	-	-	
Total	First	13	4	31	12	-	
	Second	10	9	5	-	-	
	Total	23	13	36	12	-	
POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE							
Bulgaria (since 1990)	First	1	-	2	2	-	
	Second	-	1	-	1	-	

¹⁴ Among the liberal parties there are social-liberal and conservative-liberal, and among the conservative ones - social-conservative, liberal-conservative and national-conservative parties Hartmann S., *Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe. How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies*, Wyd. Springer 2015, s. 89.

Estonia (since 1992)	First	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
Latvia (since 1990)	First	-	5	-	3	1	-	-
	Second	1	4	-	2	2	-	-
Lithuania (since 1990)	First	1	3	-	2	-	-	-
	Second	2	2	2	-	-	-	-
Poland (since 1989)	First	1	-	3	2	-	-	-
	Second	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
Romania (since 1990)	First	8	6	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	9	-	-	1	-	-
Slovakia (since 1990)	First	2	-	2	1	-	-	-
	Second	-	2	-	2	-	-	-
Slovenia (since 1990)	First	1	2	1	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	2	-	2	-	-	-
Hungary (since 1990)	First	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Croatia (since 2000)	First	1	-	-	3	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
Czech Republic (since 1992)	First	1	-	1	3	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	3	-	-	-	-
Total	First	19	19	9	16	1	-	-
	Second	5	21	7	9	3	-	-
	Total	24	40	16	25	4	-	-
<i>NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>								
Austria (since 1945)	First	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Denmark (since 1945)	First	21	9	-	5	-	-	-
	Second	-	13	-	7	-	-	-
Iceland (since 1946)	First	4	1	-	1	-	-	-
	Second	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>								

Luxembourg (since 1945)	First	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands (since 1946)	First	1	2	5	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	4	3	1	-	-	-	-
Norway (since 1945)	First	12	-	2	6	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	1	6	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal (since 1975)	First	7	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
United Kingdom (since 1945)	First	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland (1945–2000)	First	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
France (since 1958)	First	6	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Sweden (since 1944)	First	19	2	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Second	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	First	74	25	8	18	-	-	-	-
	Second	3	27	9	13	-	-	-	-
	Total	77	52	17	31	-	-	-	-
ALL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES									
Total	First	106	48	48	46	1	-	-	-
	Second	18	57	21	22	3	-	-	-
	Total	124	105	69	68	4	-	-	-

Zdrodo: Panchak-Bialobloka N., *Uряды мєншєстєи в європейських парламентських демократиїх*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2017; Ieraci G., Poropat F., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Universitа di Trieste 2013, zrodo: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.05.2019]; Doring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments database: Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, ParlGov, zrodo: <http://www.parlgov.org> [odczyt: 01.05.2019]; Armingeon K., Weisstaer D., Knopfle L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Wyd. Universitat Bern 2014, zrodo: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.05.2019].

The second largest governmental minority parties are as usual liberal (however, this is not the case for Iceland and Norway, on the average). Although, there is no ideology balance among the largest governmental parties even in the present sample of countries, as social democracy prevails over liberalism with a significant «gap». A completely different situation can be observed in Western European systems of positive parliamentarism. In this group of countries, Christian democracy is the most widespread ideology among the minority governments largest parties. It is especially true for Greece and Italy, but not peculiar or less so for Belgium, Ireland, Spain and France. The second largest government cabinets of minority cabinets most often ideologically adhere to Social Democracy and Liberalism, which is most typical of Ireland, Italy and France. With regard to Central and Eastern European systems of positive parliamentarism, it is complicated to single out the most common ideology of the minority cabinets largest governmental parties, for the largest governmental parties whose ideologies are liberalism, conservatism and social democracy tend to illustrate the highest frequency of minority governments formation, except for Poland, Romania and Hungary, where the ideologies of the largest governmental parties of minority governments are most often Christian democracy (Poland), and social democracy (in Romania and Hungary). Instead, the ideology of the second largest minority governments parties in Central and Eastern European countries is normally liberalism or conservatism (although the regional situation in this case appears disproportionate) (see Table 2).

Such ambiguous (and rarely unified and systematic) conclusions about the patterns of party and ideology determination and positioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies make a significant impact upon the parameters of ideological relevance / congruence of party systems to the very essence of minority governments in various types of parliamentary electoral systems.

The fact is that in the light of ideological positioning of minority governments, as estimated on the basis of the individual government parties' ideological positions proportionally to a fraction of their parliamentary mandates or ministerial portfolios, minority governments are, on the average more distant from a median voter than majority governments¹⁵. Thus, minority governments are to a lesser extent determined by centrist parties, but by those, which are the largest in size (obviously, which is not the same). In contrast, some researchers argue that the minority governments announcement of their programs, along with the influence of parliamentary committees on the modification of government bills does not actually affect the determinant influence of median parties. In reality, however, minority governments, being compelled by non-governmental parliamentary parties that provide formal/informal support to minority governments¹⁶, often make an ideological shift towards or from the median voter. This confirms the classic conclusion that, in case of minority governments, there exists a wide range

¹⁵ Powell B., *Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence*, Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28 August 2014, s. 1.

¹⁶ Martin L., Stevenson R., *Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy and the Coalition Compromise*, *American Journal of Political Science* 2014, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 979-996.; Martin L., Vanberg G., *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011.; Warwick P., *Voters, Parties, and Declared Government Policy*, *Comparative Political Studies* 2011, vol 44, nr. 12, s. 1675-1699.

of varied mechanisms and agreements that is capable of linking government cabinets and non-governmental (opposition) political parties, making a particular influence on the procedures and consequences of adopting administrative and political decisions. Therefore, minority governments may distort ideological congruence between the stance of voters and exercise of executive power, which in fact violates the fundamental criterion of political democracy as reflected by political representation¹⁷.

In this light it is particularly obvious that peculiarities of minority governments lie in the fact that given their ability to impose the their parties' election promises is decisive in the political and administrative process, they differ significantly from the majority governments. Essentially, minority government parties formally head various ministries, agencies, and departments, that is the key institutions of political and administrative process, through which they can in a relatively simple manner fulfil numerous election promises. However, minority government parties cannot just as easily implement other, perhaps most significant and innovative election promises, including those requiring legislative and parliamentary approval. In order to pass legislation, including the budget approval, minority governments must gain support of other non-governmental, parliamentary parties. The same applies to parliamentary procedures for confidence / investiture and / or inconfidence votes, which may result in the formation and / or termination of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies. Therefore, minority governments are vulnerable to parameters and consequences of voting by other, non-governmental, parliamentary parties, hence they often agree to all sorts of political-ideological and authority compromises. As a consequence, the parameters of ideological positioning and ideological conformity of minority governments are frequently changing.

Therefore, based on various methods of analysing the ideological positioning and ideological conformity of governments, it is apparent that, on the average, minority governments are substantially farther from median electoral positions than majority governments, especially in countries with proportional electoral systems. However, distinct (in terms of political positions and ideologies) parties have diversified effects on the minority governments «distance» from the position of the middle or median voter. Firstly, the formation of minority governments and the position of those, determining the political and administrative process are influenced by middle / median (centrist) parliamentary parties, even regardless of government alignment of such parties. Secondly, the parties with the largest parliamentary representation have a substantial influence on the formation of minority governments and the position of those who determine the political and administrative process, merely in the case when such parties are governmental. Penultimately, parliamentary parties with the most favourable ideological position and size, make the most significant impact upon the formation of minority governments. Herein, these are the parties that are both median centrist and having the largest parliamentary representation.

¹⁷ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Strom K., The Presthus Debate: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway, *American Political Science Review* 1994, vol 88, nr. 1, s. 112-127.

After all, in fact they are always governmental, therefore most significantly affecting political and administrative process. Last but not least, other parliamentary parties endowed with government cabinet portfolios control the political and administrative process in proportion to the number of parliamentary mandates or ministerial portfolios they hold (in terms of the mandates or portfolios of other and all parties in accordance with the «Gamson's Law of Proportionality»¹⁸).

In addition, it is quite obvious that the parameters of the minority governments ideological conformity can be discussed on the basis of other scientific assumptions. As researchers claim¹⁹, the stability of governments is a prerequisite for the parties with government portfolios to influence political and administrative process. Therefore, in order to fulfil its program and achieve political and ideological goals, the government must hold power over a certain period, exercising its authority. It is necessary for the government to draft relevant legislation, pass it through parliament and subsequently implement it. Even the political and ideological tasks of governments, settled without the parliamentary involvement, yet implemented in accordance with regulations and decrees, need time to be secured by the bureaucratic apparatus. Accordingly, more stable governments are on average more successful in changing their own status quo in terms of their desires and commitments²⁰. As minority governments are theoretically less stable than majority governments, and can be easily (or always) dismissed from office by parliamentary vote-of-confidence procedures, they are also less successful in changing their own status quo in terms of their personal wishes and obligations. This is more true for «short-lived» minority governments and less common for «long-lived» minority governments (more similar to majority governments). Nevertheless, minority government parties, as well as majority government parties, are significantly focused on fulfilling their election promises.

In addition, researchers note that in parliamentary democracies, parties without government portfolios can, under certain conditions, influence government policies. The fact is that the so-called «parties of vivid external support», which affect the formation and functioning of minority governments, have more political and managerial influence than other non-governmental parties. Minority governments operating on the basis of inter-party compromises logic and particularly oriented to the formal commitments of non-governmental parties, are referred to as «pseudo-minority governments» or «formal minority governments»²¹. These normally do not need to negotiate adoption of bills, initiated by minority governments, with other oppositional parliamentary parties. Therefore, minority governments are more functionally similar to majority governments. Although this is not quite the case, the role of non-governmental parties that formally support such minority governments has remained peculiar. Therefore, «vivid foreign support» parties from

¹⁸ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *"American Sociological Review"* 1961, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 363-382.; Bäck H., Persson T., *Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: A Study of the Mechanism Underlying Gamson's Law of Proportionality*, Prepared for delivery at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Granada, 14–19 April 2004.

¹⁹ Powell B., *Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence*, Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28 August 2014, s. 9-12.

²⁰ Thomson R., Royed T., Naurin E., *Explaining the Fulfilment of Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Government Institutions*, Paper Presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington 2014.

²¹ Andeweg R., *Parties in Parliament: The Blurring of Opposition*, [w:] Mueller W., Narud H. (eds.), *Party Governance and Party Democracy: Festschrift to Kaare Strom*, Wyd. Springer 2013, s. 99-114.

minority government have a significant impact on the announced government policy²². In addition, these parties are increasingly expressing their support of minority governments²³. However, the proportion of minority governments, opting to use the services of «parties of vivid external support» has not increased significantly. The fact is that minority governments can also create opportunities to influence the political process for opposition parliamentary parties that do not have any formal commitments to minority governments²⁴. This may concern the interaction correlation between minority governments and different types of opposition parties, in particular the middle (median) parliamentary parties or all opposition parliamentary parties.

In case of median parliamentary parties as opposed to minority governments, an anticipated and empirically correct assumption is that minority governments themselves offer the middle / median parties greater amounts of political influence. This coincides with the theory of coalitions, in terms of which the importance of median parties is decisive even without their being governmental. Such parties should always be regarded as particularly influential in negotiations, supporting legislative initiatives in parliaments, between minority government parties and other, non-governmental, parliamentary parties²⁵. It should be noted that at times minority governments are parliament-controlled, so in such a case the middle or median (centrist) party is theoretically the key legislative actor. When it comes to correlating all opposition parties with minority governments, the empirically correct assertion would be that minority governments also guarantee all opposition parties greater political influence. This occurs due to the fact that minority governments can make political and administrative decisions, diverse in terms of their ideological convictions and may not always be supported by identical opposition parties. Accordingly, minority governments may need parliamentary support from different opposition parties to ensure adoption of their political and administrative decisions. As a result, nearly all non-governmental parties in proviso of minority governments functioning, may be determined by the amount of political influence²⁶.

Finally, researchers argue that parameters of the ideological conformity of minority governments can be discussed on the basis of the parliamentary committee structures analysis, providing opposition parties in different types of government, including minority governments, with the opportunity to influence the expected legislative results. Various studies demonstrate that in some legislative bodies the structures of parliamentary committees and other institutions can determine the criteria for modifying bills, including governmental ones.

²² Warwick P., Voters, Parties, and Declared Government Policy, *Comparative Political Studies* 2011, vol 44, nr. 12, s. 1675-1699.

²³ Christiansen F., Damgaard E., Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism: Scandinavia, *Journal of Legislative Studies* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1-2, s. 46-76.; Andeweg R., *Parties in Parliament: The Blurring of Opposition*, [w:] Mueller W., Narud H. (eds.), *Party Governance and Party Democracy: Festschrift to Kaare Strom*, Wyd. Springer 2013, s. 99-114.

²⁴ Powell B., *Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence*, Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28 August 2014, s. 10.

²⁵ Carey J., Hix S., The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems, *American Journal of Political Science* 2011, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 387-388.

²⁶ Powell B., Election Laws and Representative Government, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol 36, nr. 2, s. 291-315.; Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 108-109.

They may even serve as mechanisms, assisting opposition parties in formulating, modifying and defining legislation²⁷. This is particularly peculiar for institutional scenarios for minority governments. Therefore, ideological patterns of minority governments should always be thoroughly analyzed. In this respect, it is obvious that minority governments in European parliamentary democracies are almost always (except for other factors) formed and operating on the basis of judiciously predetermined and relevant party and ideology determinants, hence they are defined by a specific ideological positioning. Such a state of affairs is more common in Western Europe and less typical of Central and Eastern Europe. Such determinants are derived from the party ideologies along with their aspirations for the parliamentary elections, since they serve as critical structural constraints on the government-forming process.

From such a perspective, we support the scientific arguments, claiming that party and ideological determinants, as well as peculiarities of minority governments positioning serve as both «motivators» and «safety levers», depending on the specific institutional environment, and minority governments. Indeed, they identify various strategies under which minority governments are formed / not formed, as well as operate²⁸. As a matter of fact, these strategies are interpreted through the prism of legislative parliamentary (not necessarily governmental) coalitions and based on them, and therefore are legislative strategies of minority governments. They depend, at least in European parliamentary democracies, on the institutional conditions, government-forming and negotiating power of parties, political and ideological aims of parties, involving the minority governments use of the policy of compromise and concessions in the form of a «bargaining chip» to construe alliances and legislative coalitions around certain government bills. As a result, minority governments are attracted by the support of opposition (non-governmental) parties, yet, in their turn, they guaranteeing some political benefits²⁹, thereby enabling adoption of the legislation, initiated by minority governments.

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²⁷ Strøm K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Powell B., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.; Döring H., *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 1995.

²⁸ Godbout J.-F., Hoyland B., Coalition voting and minority governments in Canada, "Commonwealth & Comparative Politics" 2011, vol 49, nr 4, s. 457-485.; Godbout J.-F., Hoyland B., *Legislative Coalitions and Minority Governments in Canada*, Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Meeting Ottawa, 29 May 2009.

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